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Two core meanings of “utility” are distinguished. “Decision utility” is the
weight of an outcome in a decision. “Experienced utility” is hedonic quality, as in
Bentham’s usage. Experienced utility can be reported in real time (instant utility),
or in retrospective evaluations of past episodes (remembered utility). Psychologi-
cal research has documented systematic errors in retrospective evaluations,
which can induce a preference for dominated options. We propose a formal norma-
tive theory of the total experienced utility of temporally extended outcomes. Mea-
suring the experienced utility of outcomes permits tests of utility maximization
and opens other lines of empirical research.
INTRODUCTION
The concept of utility has carried two quite different mean-
ings in its long history. As Bentham [1789] used it, utility refers
to pleasure and pain, the “sovereign masters” that “point out
what we ought to do, as well as determine what we shall do.” This
usage was retained in the economic writings of the nineteenth
century, but it was gradually replaced by a different interpreta-
tion [Stigler 1950]. In current economics and in decision theory,
the utility of outcomes and attributes refers to their weight in
decisions: utility is inferred from observed choices and is in turn
used to explain these choices. To distinguish the two notions, we
shall refer to Bentham’s concept as experienced utility and to the
modern usage as decision utility. With few exceptions,1 experi-
enced utility is essentially ignored in modern economic discourse.
The rejection of experienced utility is justied by two standard
arguments: (i) subjective hedonic experience cannot be observed
or measured; (ii) choices provide all necessary information about
the utility of outcomes because rational agents who wish to do so
will optimize their hedonic experience. Contrary to this position,
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1. For some recent attempts to use subjective measures in economic analy-
ses, see Clark and Oswald [1994], Kapteyn [1994], Tinbergen [1991], and van
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we will argue that experienced utility is both measurable and em-
pirically distinct from decision utility.
The following example illustrates the distinction between the
two concepts of utility.2 A patient suffering from unusually pro-
found amnesia has two toasters in his kitchen. The toaster on the
right functions normally. The toaster on the left delivers an elec-
tric shock when the toast is removed. The patient’s gasp and
quick retraction of his hand indicate that the shock is painful.
Because the patient does not remember the experience, however,
he does not anticipate the shock the next morning, and is conse-
quently indifferent between the toasters. The patient’s decision
utility for using the two toasters is equal, but his experienced
utilities are quite different. The patient’s choices of the left-hand
toaster will not maximize utility in Bentham’s sense. As we will
show later, discrepancies between decision utility and experi-
enced utility are not restricted to such pathological cases. Sys-
tematic errors in the evaluation of past events and decisions that
do not maximize future experienced utility can be observed in
decision makers whose cognitive functions are normal. These ob-
servations raise doubts about a methodology in which observed
choices provide the only measure of the utility of outcomes.
Pleasure and displeasure are attributes of each moment of
experience, but the outcomes that people value are normally ex-
tended over time. The basic building block of experienced utility
in our analysis is instant utility: a measure of hedonic and af-
fective experience, which can be derived from immediate reports
of current subjective experience or from physiological indices. In-
stant utility corresponds to the dimension of “intensity” in the
writings of Bentham, Jevons, and Edgeworth. The focus of our
analysis is the evaluation of temporally extended outcomes
(TEOs), such as a single medical procedure or the concatenation
of a Kenya safari and subsequent episodes of slide-showing and
storytelling. Two measures of the experienced utility of tempo-
rally extended outcomes will be considered. Remembered utility
is a measure on past TEOs, which is inferred from a subject’s
retrospective reports of the total pleasure or displeasure associ-
ated with past outcomes. Total utility is a normative concept. It is
a measure on possible TEOs, which is constructed from temporal
proles of instant utility according to a set of normative rules.
Decision utility is a measure on TEOs which is inferred from
choices, either by direct comparisons of similar objects or by indi-
2. This example was suggested by Paul Romer.
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rect methods, such as elicited willingness to pay. Finally, we will
discuss predicted utility, which refers to beliefs about the experi-
enced utility of outcomes. The relations among the various utility
concepts dene a complex agenda for research. Figure I lists some
of the questions that arise. Several of these questions will be ad-
dressed here.
Section I discusses the adaptive signicance and the mea-
surement of instant and remembered utility. Section II describes
studies in which participants provided a continuous record of in-
stant utility during an episode (e.g., a short lm, or a medical
procedure), and later reported a global evaluation of the episode
(remembered utility), or made choices about which of several epi-
sodes to repeat (decision utility). These studies are concerned
with the determinants of remembered utility (question #4 in Fig-
ure I) and with the role of remembered utility in choice (#8). The
duration of episodes played very little role in subjects’ retrospec-
tive evaluations in these experiments, contrary to an obvious
normative rule (#5). Subjects also made choices that exposed
them to avoidable pain or discomfort, in violation of dominance.
Their decisions did not maximize experienced utility (#9), al-
though they may have maximized remembered utility (#10).
Section III and the Appendix present a normative theory of
total utility, which yields rules for the evaluation of temporally
extended outcomes on the basis of a temporal prole of instant
utility (#3). The theory assumes time-neutral weighting of in-
stants (no time preference) and derives temporal integration as
the principle of global evaluation. Section IV elaborates on the
consequences of accepting experienced utility as a measure of the
quality of outcomes, distinct from decision utility. The section
also includes a brief review of some results concerning the accu-
racy of predicted utility (#6). Section V concludes. Proofs are pre-
sented in the Appendix.
An important reservation should be stated early. Our norma-
tive treatment of the utility of temporally extended outcomes
adopts a hedonic interpretation of utility, but no endorsement of
Bentham’s view of pleasure and pain as sovereign masters of hu-
man action is intended. Our analysis applies to situations in
which a separate value judgment designates experienced utility
as a relevant criterion for evaluating outcomes.3 This set does not
include all human outcomes, but it is certainly not empty.
3. For more comprehensive conceptions of the quality of life, see Dasgupta
[1993], Nussbaum and Sen [1993], and Sen [1991].
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FIGURE I
Research Designs for the Study of Experienced Utility
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I. THE FUNCTIONS OF EXPERIENCED UTILITY
We have distinguished two descriptive notions of experienced
utility: instant utility is the pleasure or distress of the moment;
remembered utility is the retrospective evaluation of a tempo-
rally extended outcome. This section presents a brief introduction
to the biology and psychology of these forms of utility, and to some
issues of measurement.
The adaptive functions of pleasure and pain can be deduced
from the conditions under which these experiences are biologi-
cally programmed to occur. Pleasure is evidently a “go” signal,
which guides the organism to continue important activities such
as foreplay or consuming sweet, energy-rich food. Pain is a “stop”
signal, which interrupts activities that are causing harm, such as
placing weight on a wounded foot. The common characteristic of
the basic forms of pleasure and distress is that they regulate the
response to the current situation.
To achieve its function in the control of immediate consump-
tion or escape, hedonic value must accurately reect the needs of
the moment. The palatability of salt, for example, increases in
conditions of sodium depletion. On a different time scale, the he-
donic value of food changes substantially during a single feeding
episode, and normally drops to zero or becomes negative when
feeding continues beyond satiation [Cabanac 1971]. Of course,
not all human pleasures and pains are biologically programmed
in detail. Prior consumption experiences and various cultural and
social inuences can alter the hedonic value of stimuli, as when
people learn to like coffee or chili peppers, develop a dislike for
rich desserts, or acquire a passion for opera. Furthermore, posi-
tive or negative instant utility can be evoked by social stimuli,
such as smiles or frowns, and by purely internal events such as
memories of embarrassment or amusing thoughts [Schelling
1984]. In spite of the immense diversity in the occasions that
evoke pleasure (or displeasure) in the human adult, the hedonic
attribute that they share is salient and readily recognized.
The view that hedonic states cannot be measured because
they are private events is widely held but incorrect. The measure-
ment of subjective experiences and the determination of the func-
tions that relate subjective variables to features of present and
past stimuli are topics in the well-established eld of psycho-
physical research [Stevens 1975; Wegener 1982]. The loudness of
a noise and the felt temperature of a limb are no less subjective
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than pleasure and pain. The main argument for considering
these experiences measurable is that the functions that relate
subjective intensity to physical variables are qualitatively similar
for different people. For example, reported subjective intensity is
often a power function of physical magnitude, with an exponent
that varies for different sensory dimensions. Pleasure and dis-
tress have the same status: the psychophysical functions that
govern the pleasure of drinking sugar solutions and the pain of
electric shock are orderly and interpersonally similar [Stevens
1975]. Verbal or numerical reports of hedonic value can be sup-
plemented by physiological indicators of emotional quality and
intensity, including objective measurements of subtle facial ex-
pressions [Frank 1988]. Although the correlations among these
measures are imperfect, the variance they share can serve to op-
erationalize the concept of instant experienced utility.
As an object of measurement, experienced utility has much
in common with subjective temperature. Like hot and cold, the
experiences of pleasure and distress differ in quality. A scale that
ranges from extreme pleasure to extreme distress (or from very
hot to very cold) effectively comprises separate scales for two dis-
tinct attributes. The two scales are joined by a distinctive neutral
point: “neither hot nor cold,” “neither pleasant nor unpleasant.”
The stimulus that gives rise to a neutral experience may be dif-
ferent in different contexts, but the neutral experience itself is
constant. A standard demonstration involves two pails of warm
water, one warmer than the other. A subject who immerses one
hand in each of these pails will eventually report that both hands
feel alike, neither hot nor cold. The neutral value provides a natu-
ral zero point for bipolar dimensions. Because of its distinc-
tiveness, the neutral value can be used with some condence
to match thermal (or hedonic) experiences across time for a
given individual, and even to support interpersonal comparisons
[Kahneman and Varey 1991].
Remembered utilities also have an adaptive function: they
determine whether a situation experienced in the past should
now be approached or avoided. Unlike pain and pleasure, which
control behavior in the current situation, learned attractions and
aversions adjust current behavior to the remembered evaluations
of events in the past. Remembered utilities can be measured in
humans by reported evaluations of past experiences, or by
physiological indications of the emotion aroused by reminders of
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the event. Remembered utilities can also be inferred from the ap-
proach or avoidance tendencies that they induce.
Like the hedonic system, the system that governs the re-
membered evaluation of past experiences has been under evolu-
tionary pressure. However, the effect of natural selection is to
increase overall tness, not necessarily to produce organisms
that maximize pleasure and minimize pain over time. For ex-
ample, the fear displayed by rats that have been repeatedly ex-
posed to an electric shock is affected by the intensity of the shock,
but not by its duration [Mowrer and Solomon 1954]. The next
section reports similar observations of duration neglect in human
subjects. These ndings suggest that the system that forms and
stores evaluations of situations is not designed to optimize expe-
rienced utility.
II. THE EXPERIENCED UTILITY AND DECISION UTILITY OF EPISODES
The present section summarizes the results of a series of
studies of remembered utility, which investigated two questions:
(i) what attributes of the temporal prole of instant utility deter-
mine the remembered utility of an episode? (ii) are biases in re-
membered utility reected in subsequent choices? A central issue
in these studies was the role of duration as a determinant of
the utility of episodes. The results support two generalizations.
(1) Peak-End evaluation: the remembered utility of pleasant or
unpleasant episodes is accurately predicted by averaging the
Peak (most intense value) of instant utility (or disutility) re-
corded during an episode and the instant utility recorded near
the end of the experience. (2) Decisions by remembered utility:
when given the choice of which of several episodes to repeat, indi-
viduals generally choose the episode that has the highest remem-
bered utility. Two consequences of Peak-End evaluation have
been conrmed, both in measures of remembered utility and in
choices. (1) Duration neglect: the duration of experiences has
little or no independent effect on their remembered utility. (2)
Violations of temporal monotonicity: the remembered disutility of
an aversive episode can be reduced by adding an extra period of
discomfort that reduces the Peak-End average.
Several experimental designs were employed in this re-
search. The participants in the experiments generally provided
continuous or intermittent measures of instant utility, which per-
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mitted a computation of the Peak-End average. The duration of
the episodes was allowed to vary naturally in some studies, and
was varied experimentally in others. Diverse measures of remem-
bered utility were used, including ratings of overall aversiveness
and comparative evaluations. Choices were recorded in some of
the experiments.
Participants in experiments reported by Fredrickson and
Kahneman [1993] were exposed to sixteen short, plotless lm
clips. Half of these lms were pleasant (e.g., views of a coral reef),
half were aversive (e.g., an amputation). There were two versions
of each lm: a short version (approximately 45 seconds) and a
longer version (approximately 120 seconds), with no notable
variation of content or affective value. Each subject saw the short
versions of half the lms and the long versions of the others. The
subjects used a sliding knob that controlled an array of colored
lights to provide a continuous measure of the instant utility (or
disutility) they experienced during the presentation of each lm
[Gottman and Levenson 1985].
Several measures of remembered utility were used. Partici-
pants in one study answered the question “Overall, how much
pleasure [displeasure or discomfort] did you experience during
the lm?” Because this instruction could perhaps be interpreted
as referring to the most extreme affect experienced during the
episode, another measure was used in a subsequent study. Par-
ticipants were told that the researchers sought their advice to
compile videotapes that subjects would view in future experi-
ments. The task was to rank the lms according to the contribu-
tion each made to the overall affective experience of viewing the
videotape. Pleasant and unpleasant clips were ranked separately.
The ranking of the aversive clips was explained as follows: “The
unpleasant videotape will consist of several of the unrelated un-
pleasant clips that you just saw. Of course people who will see
this unpleasant videotape will experience some unpleasant-
ness. . . . Your task is to help us select the unpleasant clips we
should include in order to MINIMIZE the overall experience of
unpleasantness for most people.”
The results of both experiments generally supported the
hypotheses of Peak-End evaluation and duration neglect. In a
within-subject regression analysis of the rst experiment, the
mean correlations between the Peak-End average of the real-time
measure and ratings of remembered utility were .77 for pleasant
lms and .69 for aversive lms. When the Peak-End measure was
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statistically controlled, the mean correlations between the re-
membered utility of lms clips and their duration were .06 and
2 .02, respectively.4 Very similar results were obtained with the
ranking measure used in the second experiment. The subjects’
rankings of the lm clips they wished to include in a videotape
were entirely unaffected by duration.
Duration neglect and Peak-End evaluation were conrmed
in a more realistic setting, using a between-subjects design [Re-
delmeier and Kahneman 1996a]. The participants were patients
undergoing a colonoscopy in a Toronto hospital. The patients re-
ported their level of discomfort every 60 seconds throughout the
procedure (see Figure II). Later, the patients reported the remem-
bered disutility of the procedure, using several different scales.
The patients rated the “total amount of pain experienced” on a
10-point scale. They also ranked a list of unpleasant experiences,
which included “the colonoscopy you have just had” along with
other incidents, such as stubbing a toe and “an average visit to
the dentist.” The patients were also required to indicate a prefer-
ence between a repeat colonoscopy and a barium enema. Peak-
End evaluation and duration neglect were observed for all these
measures. For example, the correlation of the Peak-End average
with the global rating of the procedure was .67. Although there
was substantial variability in the duration of the colonoscopies
that different patients experienced (the mean duration was 23
minutes, with a standard deviation of 13 minutes), the correla-
tion between duration and the global evaluation of the procedure
was only .03. Figure II shows illustrative data for two patients.
Although most observers judge that Patient B had a worse expe-
rience, the Peak-End rule correctly predicts a worse retrospective
evaluation by Patient A, whose End rating was much higher.
A notable feature of this study is that robust results were
obtained in a design which effectively assumes the interpersonal
comparability of measures of experienced utility. Several ndings
support the conclusion that people share a common scale for both
instant and remembered utility. First, the requirement to provide
ratings of discomfort during the procedure was eliminated for a
group of 53 patients; an observer who attended the examination
4. The rst-order correlation between disutility and duration was signicant
for the aversive clips, but this correlation was produced by a general tendency for
the ratings of instant discomfort to increase during the exposure of these clips. A
pattern of escalating discomfort is common in aversive situations, where it in-
duces a positive correlation between duration and the Peak-End measure.
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estimated the patient’s discomfort every 60 seconds. The Peak-
End average of the observer ’s estimates predicted the retrospec-
tive evaluations subsequently elicited from patients (r 5 .71).
Second, the physicians who administered the procedure also pro-
vided several ratings of each patient’s overall discomfort. The cor-
relation between the ratings of patients and physicians was .67.
The physicians evidently applied the same model of evaluation
(Peak-End rule and duration neglect) as did the patients. One of
the questions put to the physicians was whether more anesthetic
should have been used. The correlation between answers to this
question and the duration of the procedure was .05.
The psychological interpretation of this pattern of ndings
is straightforward. The subjects and observers in these studies
apparently constructed a representative moment of each episode
they had experienced (or observed), and used this representative
moment as a proxy to evaluate the utility of the entire episode.
FIGURE II
Pain Intensity Reported by Two Colonoscopy Patients (from Redelmeier and
Kahneman [1996]).
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The representative moment is better described as a collage than
as a precise memory of a particular instant of the experience; it
is affected by several singular instants, including the peak and
the end of the episode. The duration of the episode is not included
in this basic representation, even when it is accurately known
[Fredrickson and Kahneman 1993; Kahneman, Fredrickson,
Schreiber, and Redelmeier 1993; Varey and Kahneman 1992].
The Peak-End representation controls an emotional response,
which is reected in the global evaluations of the episode, and
which we label remembered utility. As was previously observed
in the fear response of lower animals [Mowrer and Salomon
1954], this emotional response is essentially independent of dura-
tion. When their attention is directed to it, of course, human sub-
jects universally agree that duration is a relevant attribute of
pleasant or aversive episodes.
The Peak-End rule entails violations of temporal monoton-
icity: adding an extra period of discomfort to an aversive episode
will improve the remembered utility of the episode if the added
period ends on a less unpleasant note. Redelmeier and Kahne-
man [1996b] tested this prediction in a clinical setting, with a
large population (N 5 682) of patients undergoing a colonoscopy.
Half the patients were randomly assigned to a condition in which
the procedure was extended by leaving the colonoscope in place
for about a minute after the completion of the clinical examina-
tion. The patients were not informed of the experimental treat-
ment. The experience during the added period was mildly
uncomfortable (certainly less preferred than the alternative of re-
moving the instrument) but for many patients less painful than
the preceding moments. As predicted by the Peak-End rule, the
prolongation of the colonoscopy yielded a highly signicant im-
provement in the global evaluations of the procedure. The pur-
pose of the experiment was to test the hypothesis that an
intervention that reduces the remembered disutility of the proce-
dure could increase patients’ willingness to undergo further co-
lonoscopies if needed.
We next consider whether the biases of remembered utility
transfer to decision utility. As we saw earlier, the description of
behavior as governed by pleasure and pain is only applicable to
consumption and escape. In many other situations the sovereign
masters that determine what people do are not pleasure and
pain, but memories of pleasure and pain. Indeed, the only utility
that people (and other organisms) can learn from personal experi-
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ence to maximize is the utility that they remember. If a retrospec-
tive evaluation distorts the hedonic quality of an experience,
subsequent preferences will be governed by the biased evalua-
tion, not by the original experience. This reasoning implies that
the violations of temporal monotonicity observed in ratings of re-
membered utility should also be observed in actual choices. Sev-
eral experiments have tested this prediction.
Participants in an experiment reported by Kahneman et al.
[1993] were advised that they would undergo painful experiences,
and as part of the informed consent procedure were asked to im-
merse a hand to the wrist in very cold water, for ten seconds.
They were told to expect three trials of this kind, but only two
were actually conducted. In the Short trial the subject kept one
hand in water at 14°C for 60 seconds, after which he was allowed
to remove the hand from the water and to dry it with a warm
towel. In the Long trial the immersion lasted a total of 90 sec-
onds. Water temperature was kept at 14° for the rst 60 seconds,
at which point (unbeknownst to the subject) the experimenter
caused the temperature of the water to rise gradually from 14° to
15° over the next 30 seconds. Different hands were used for the
Short and for the Long trials. Half the subjects experienced the
Short trial before the Long one; the sequence was reversed for
the other subjects. The trials were separated by seven minutes
during which the subject performed an unrelated task, which was
resumed after the second trial. Seven minutes later, the subject
was called in for a third trial, informed that one of the two previ-
ous procedures would be repeated exactly, given a choice of
whether the rst or the second trial should be repeated, and
asked to answer several questions about the rst two trials.
Several experiments were conducted in this general design,
with minor variations of procedure. The 32 participants in the
main experiment used a “discomfort meter” to provide a continu-
ous indication of the pain they experienced, on a scale ranging
from 0 (no pain at all) to 14 (intolerable pain). The real-time re-
cords permitted a classication of subjects into two groups. Most
subjects indicated a decline of two or more points on the pain
scale during the last 30 seconds of the experiment; the mean level
of pain that these subjects recorded was 8.5 at 60 seconds and 4.4
at 90 seconds. For these subjects the Peak-End average was
lower on the Long than on the Short trial. As expected, a large
majority of them (17 of 21) preferred to repeat the Long trial. The
other eleven subjects did not indicate a signicant decrease of
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pain as the temperature of the water was raised. For these sub-
jects the Peak-End average was very similar on the Short and on
the Long trial. Only ve of the eleven subjects preferred the Long
trial. The difference between the preferences of the two groups
was statistically signicant, as was the overall preference for the
Long trial (69 percent for the 32 subjects). To check the ro-
bustness of the results, the experiment was replicated with 37
new subjects, without the requirement to report pain in real time.
The results conrmed the original ndings: 65 percent of the new
subjects preferred to repeat the Long rather than the Short trial.
Subjects did not spend much time in analytic comparisons
before choosing which trial to repeat: they simply determined
which of the two memories they disliked less. Postexperimental
interviews and other observations provided no support for more
speculative accounts. First, the interviews conrmed that the
Long trial was not chosen out of a wish to endure more pain.
Indeed, all subjects quickly removed their hand from the water
as soon as they were allowed to do so. Second, the subjects never
described the last segment of the Long trial as a pleasurable ex-
perience. Third, they did not prefer the Long trial because it
yielded a more pleasant postimmersion experience. On the con-
trary, pleasurable relief was more intense after the Short trial.
The neglect of duration in this experiment represents neither
a failure of duration memory (most subjects could correctly an-
swer a question about the durations of the two trials) nor a delib-
erate strategy. We have observed in unpublished experiments
that subjects who are are asked to choose between hypothetical
proles of a Long and Short trial almost invariably obey domi-
nance, although most subjects follow the Peak-End rule and im-
plicitly violate dominance when judging a series of hypothetical
proles one by one [Varey and Kahneman 1992]. In the cold-
water experiment, the choice is made by comparing remembered
utilities, without performing the explicit comparison that could
reveal the Long trial to be a dominated option.
The violations of dominance observed in the cold-water ex-
periment have been replicated with loud sounds as aversive stim-
uli [Schreiber and Kahneman 1996]. Subjects heard pairs of
sounds in immediate succession, then indicated which of the two
sounds they would rather hear repeated in a subsequent phase
of the experiment. Some of the stimuli were constructed along
the lines of the cold-water experiment. For example, one of the
pairs of stimuli that the subjects heard was (i) ten seconds of an
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unpleasant sound at 78 db, and (ii) the same sound followed by
four additional seconds at a lower intensity (66db). There was a
signicant preference for repeating the Long sounds in such
pairs. The pattern did not change in the course of a series of ten
decisions, including ve which pitted a Long sound against a
Short one.
The experiments reviewed in this section all involved short
episodes, in which the subjects were passive. The episodes were
also hedonically homogeneous; none combined pleasant and un-
pleasant moments. Although the exact pattern of ndings may be
specic to this particular class of situations, the results support
two general observations. The rst observation is methodological:
some peculiarities of preferences are unlikely to be understood,
or even detected, without rst understanding experienced and re-
membered utility. The second observation is that the statement
that decisions maximize utility is not a tautology; it can be
proved false.
III. NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
The subjects in the experiments described in the preceding
section violated a compelling principle of temporal monotonicity.
We therefore claimed to have observed preferences that do not
maximize experienced utility, but we did not specify precisely
what maximization means in the context of temporally extended
outcomes. We turn to this task now.
The measured primitive of experienced utility is instant util-
ity, the hedonic value of a moment of experience as immediately
reported or recorded. Signicant outcomes last more than an in-
stant, however, and the total utility of such outcomes must there-
fore be derived from a temporal prole of instant utility. The
theory presented in this section species the conditions under
which the total utility of an extended outcome is the temporal
integral of some transformation of instant utility. This normative
analysis serves two goals. On the one hand, it identies axioms
of total utility that yield a rule of temporal integration and allows
an evaluation of the intuitive appeal of these axioms. On the
other hand, the analysis constrains the measure of instant utility,
which must provide all the information required for an adequate
assessment of total utility.
The normative treatment of total utility can be interpreted
in at least two ways. The most straightforward interpretation is
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that retrospective evaluation of outcomes is a cognitive activity
in which people routinely engage, much as they engage in gram-
matical speech or in deductive reasoning. Normative standards
apply to each of these activities. Rules and errors can be identi-
ed for grammar, for deduction, and also for retrospective evalua-
tion. Economists who associate normative analysis exclusively
with decisions may prefer another interpretation, in which total
experienced utility is the objective function that a benevolent so-
cial planner would wish to maximize.
Temporal integration is an obvious candidate for a normative
principle of total utility. A sketch of the idea can be found in Edge-
worth [1881, p. 101]: “. . . let there be granted to the science of
pleasure what is granted to the science of energy; to imagine
an ideally perfect instrument, a psychophysical machine, con-
tinually registering the height of pleasure experienced by an
individual. . . . The continually indicated height is registered by
photographic or other frictionless apparatus upon a uniformly
moving vertical plane. Then the quantity of happiness between
two epochs is represented by the area contained between the
zero-line, perpendiculars thereto at the points corresponding to
the epochs, and the curve traced by the index.”
The analysis that follows assumes ordinal measurement of
both instant utility and total utility. Stronger results that require
cardinal measurement are also mentioned. Ordinal measurement
of instant utility implies that any two moments of experience can
be compared, to establish which of them carries the higher he-
donic value. The measure of instant utility should also permit
reliable identication of the hedonically neutral state, which
plays a special role in the analysis. As was mentioned earlier,
these requirements are not beyond the realm of the possible.
The following terms will be used; formal denitions are pre-
sented in the Appendix. An episode is a connected time interval
described by its temporal coordinates. A group of one or more tem-
porally disjoint episodes is called a temporally extended outcome
(TEO). The utility prole of a TEO assigns a level of instant util-
ity to each time point (see Figure II; note that the ordinate is
inverted in this gure, to correspond to the format of the pa-
tients’ ratings).
Utility proles can be concatenated. If f is a utility prole
of duration x and g is a utility prole of duration y, then their
concatenation is of duration x 1 y, coinciding with f on the rst
part and with g on the second. For example, imagine that the two
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disutility proles shown in Figure II were produced by the same
individual, during two colonoscopies conducted on separate days.
The patient’s total experience of colonoscopy could be represented
by concatenating the two proles. The analysis assumes that the
calibration of the scale of instant utility is constant, both for the
episodes included in a TEO and for TEOs that are compared with
each other. Of course, this requirement is likely to be violated
when the situations are radically different, as in comparisons of
the experiences of a person as a baby and as an adult.
We now present axioms for total utility that characterize the
integration rule. The rst axiom considers neutral utility proles,
dened as proles in which instant utilities are hedonically neu-
tral, i.e., “neither good nor bad.” It plays an essential role in com-
parisons of TEOs that differ in duration.
AXIOM 1 [concatenation of neutral utility proles]. The total util-
ity of a utility prole is not affected by concatenation with a
neutral utility prole.
The conditions that we impose next reect the consequen-
tialist requirement that a measure of instant utility should com-
prise all the information required for the determination of total
utilities.
AXIOM 2 [monotonicity in instant utility]. Increases of instant
utility do not decrease the total utility of a utility prole.
The axiom implies that any local improvement of instant
utility is perceived as an improvement of total utility, irrespective
of earlier or subsequent instant utilities.
AXIOM 3 [monotonicity in total utility]. In a concatenation of two
utility proles, replacing one prole by another with a higher
total utility will increase the total utility of the concatenation.
Axiom 3 implies separability of disjoint time periods. If one
utility prole is better than another, then this is not affected by
the utility proles that precede and follow them. The instant util-
ity ratings must be “sufcient statistics” in the sense that all the
information needed to evaluate the goodness of an episode must
be incorporated in its utility prole. In particular, any effects of
previous or anticipated consumption on the utility of present con-
sumption must be incorporated in the measure of instant utility.
Separability is commonly used to characterize additive decompos-
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ability over disjoint time intervals; thus, Axiom 3 is the crucial
axiom for the integral representations obtained in this section.
THEOREM 1. The three axioms above hold if and only if there ex-
ists a nondecreasing (“value”) transformation function of in-
stant utility, assigning value 0 to 0, such that total utility
orders utility proles according to the integral of the value of
instant utility over time.5
The normative determination of total utility consists of two
parts. Instant utilities are rst measured and then transformed
by means of the value function. As noted earlier, the same norma-
tive analysis applies to the subject who reported the instant utili-
ties and to an observer with access to the utility prole. The
theorem assumes that the instant utility ratings are ordinal ex-
cept for the zero point. The transformation yields a ratio scale,
which is unique up to multiplication by a positive scale factor.
The present formulation and axioms differ from other treatments
in the time preference literature mainly in our use of the concate-
nation operation. This operation is applicable because global
evaluations are undated. Our derivation combines techniques
from “Ho¨elder ’s theorem” with Gorman’s [1968] result on the rep-
resentation of separable preferences.
Separability in terms of outcomes is not reasonable, and
counterexamples are easily constructed. For example, the rela-
tive values of a strenuous walk and of reading a book in the after-
noon depend on whether the individual spent the morning
playing tennis or working at a computer. One response to the
problem is a nonadditive model of preferences over outcome pro-
les that permits violations of separability, as in Gilboa [1989]
and Constantinides [1990]. Our model retains separability be-
cause it assumes that utility proles are specied in terms of in-
stant utilities, not outcomes. Using measurements of instant
utility, we would expect to nd that the relative instant utilities
of alternative programs for the afternoon depend strongly on how
the morning was spent. Separability is reasonable when out-
comes are described in terms of instant utility, provided that
instant utility incorporates all order effects and interactions be-
tween outcomes. This treatment is similar to Stigler and Becker
5. Because the term utility is already used in another sense, we resort to the
term “value” to designate the transformation of instant utility.
BACK TO BENTHAM? 391
[1977], who achieved separability by redening outcomes as ap-
propriate conjunctions of present and past consumption.
An implication of Theorem 1 is that the ordering of time
points in a utility prole does not affect total utility.
COROLLARY 1. The total utility of a utility prole, and hence of a
TEO, depends only on the generated time distribution over
instant utility, i.e., the total time spent at each region of in-
stant utility.
This corollary reects the time neutrality of the model.
The analysis becomes simpler if cardinal measurement of in-
stant utility can be assumed, so that differences of instant utility
are meaningful. Transformation by the value function is not re-
quired in this case. The following axiom characterizes cardinal
measurability of instant utility.
AXIOM 4 [cardinality of instant utility]. The ordering of total util-
ity of two utility proles does not change if for both the in-
stant utility level is increased by the same constant over an
equally long time period.
THEOREM 2. Axioms 1, 2, and 4 hold if and only if total utility
orders utility proles according to the integral of instant util-
ity over time.
Theorems 1 and 2 can be simplied further if total utility is
measured at a cardinal level (Theorem A.2 and Corollary A.1 in
the Appendix).
Finally, we note the following simple implication, which is
satised in each of the models, and was tested empirically in the
experiments described in the preceding section.
COROLLARY 2 [time monotonicity]. Axioms 1 (concatenation of
neutral utility episodes) and 2 (monotonicity of instant util-
ity) imply that concatenation with a utility prole that lies
entirely above zero does not lower total utility, and concate-
nation with a wholly negative prole does not raise total
utility.
IV. DISCUSSION
The object of this paper was to show that experienced utility
is governed by a distinctive normative logic, that it is potentially
measurable, and that the empirical study of experienced utility
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is relevant to some topics of concern to economists. We discuss
these issues in turn.
1. Normative issues. Our analysis of total utility assumes a
time-neutral perspective and emphasizes duration as a feature of
outcomes. Neither idea is new. There is a long history of debate
about the normative status of time preferences, especially about
the rationality of discounting the future [Loewenstein 1992], and
duration is represented in any treatment of utility over time.
However, the context of experienced utility highlights particular
aspects of these ideas.
Although many authors have argued for a time-neutral per-
spective, the prevailing position in the economic literature is that
utility discounting is compatible with rationality. The exclusive
focus on decisions in economic thinking helps explain the toler-
ance for discounting: decision utility is evaluated from the per-
spective of an agent for whom immediate outcomes indeed loom
larger than more distant ones. In contrast, the total experienced
utility of an outcome is not evaluated from any particular point
in time. The entire utility prole of the outcome must be known,
but the date of the evaluation is irrelevant. The same reasoning
extends naturally to time-neutral weighting of early and late
segments of extended outcomes. Although other models of total
utility could be formulated, time neutrality appears most appro-
priate for the evaluation of experienced utility. The adoption of
this principle has signicant normative consequences. An impor-
tant case is the evaluation of actions that produce immediate
benets and long-term costs, a category that includes many self-
destructive practices. Discounting induces a bias in favor of these
actions, which is avoided in a time-neutral perspective. Time neu-
trality is therefore appealing, both as a rule of personal prudence
and as a principle of social planning.
To appreciate the normative signicance of temporal integra-
tion, consider an extended outcome that consists of one period of
pleasure and one period of pain. Recall that integration implies
the existence of a suitable monotonic transformation of instant
utility (and disutility) to ratio scales (invariant up to a multiplica-
tion by a positive constant) with the same zero point. The ratio of
the total durations of positive and negative periods in a mixed-
affect TEO, which is observable, jointly constrains the global
evaluation of the TEOs and the measures of instant utility and
disutility. A globally positive evaluation of such a TEO is justied
only if the ratio of the averages of (suitably transformed) utilities
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and disutilities in the two periods is more extreme than the ratios
of their durations. A global positive evaluation can appear im-
plausible when the pleasure is very brief in relation to the pain.
However, an agent who is susceptible to duration neglect in the
evaluation of TEOs will tend to assign positive remembered util-
ity to outcomes that consisted of periods of intense pleasure and
mild pain, with little regard for the relative durations of these
experiences. We suspect, for example, that duration neglect is in-
volved in the attitudes of addicts who do not regret their addic-
tion. Appropriate weighting of the durations of episodes has some
force as a rule of personal prudence and a principle of social plan-
ning [Broome 1991].
2. Measurement issues. There has been signicant progress
since Edgeworth fantasized a hedonimeter. As illustrated by the
research described earlier, continuous or intermittent measure-
ments of affect are feasible in some situations,6 where they yield
utility proles that are often quite similar for different individu-
als. Another promising development is the increasing sophistica-
tion of experience sampling techniques, in which individuals are
prompted by a preprogrammed beeper to record various aspects
of their current experience (e.g., Brandstatter [1991]). These
methods are likely to be supplemented in the future by continu-
ous or intermittent measurements of physiological indices of
stress and of hedonic states.
The advantage of real-time measures of instant utility is that
they avoid the biases of memory and evaluation that affect retro-
spective judgments of pleasure, pain, and well-being. Because
they are much easier to obtain, however, retrospective measures
will remain in frequent use. Their effectiveness is likely to be en-
hanced by procedures that reduce the impact of known biases.
For example, improved estimates of the total utility of an episode
could be obtained by eliciting from the respondent separate as-
sessments of its duration and of its average instant utility. More
generally, we propose that the measurement of experienced util-
ity should be viewed as a difcult technical problem, not a hope-
less quest.
3. Empirical Issues.As Figure I illustrated, the consideration
of experienced utility raises a complex agenda for both theoretical
6. Several studies have shown that the requirement to report instant utility
has little or no effect on subsequent global evaluations of the episode [Fredrickson
and Kahneman 1993; Kahneman et al., 1993; Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996a].
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and empirical research. Our treatment has focused on the norma-
tive question of how TEOs should be evaluated (#3 in Figure I),
and on an empirical study of the remembered and decision utility
of brief aversive episodes. We found that remembered utility is
determined by a Peak-End rule (#4), in violation of temporal inte-
gration (#5); preferences for the repetition of episodes were deter-
mined by their remembered utility (#8). As a result, decisions
failed to maximize experienced utility (#9), although they may
have maximized remembered utility (#10). These ndings should
be taken as illustrative, because of the narrow range of situations
in which they were obtained.
The effects of consumption on the utility of future consump-
tion (#2 in Figure I) play an important role in numerous economic
models of individual decisions (e.g., Becker [1996], Constantin-
ides [1990]; Gilboa [1989]). The intuitions that drive these models
pertain to the dynamics of experienced utility, but the only ob-
servables that the models allow are decisions. The chain of infer-
ences from observed decisions to experienced utility is long and,
as we illustrated earlier, sometimes unreliable. We believe that
experienced utility can only be understood when it is directly
measured, and that a deeper understanding of experienced utility
will contribute to the development of richer models of economic
decisions.
In a book that has been inuential outside economics, Scitov-
sky [1976] presented numerous ideas about experienced and pre-
dicted utility. His treatment implies that people are not generally
able to solve the problem of maximizing experienced utility sub-
ject to a budget constraint (question #9 in Figure I), at least in
part because of their limited understanding and ability to predict
their own enjoyment of goods and activities (#6). He argued that
American consumers tend to overinvest in comforts and to un-
derinvest in pleasures, and suggested that members of other cul-
tures achieve greater success in the pursuit of happiness. In the
absence of measurements of experienced utility, Scitovsky could
only support these strong claims by appealing to his readers’ in-
tuitions about the psychology of hedonic experience, and to their
normative intuitions about the good life. At least in principle,
however, his hypotheses could be studied empirically, using ap-
propriate measures of experienced and predicted utility.
Unlike Scitovsky, Becker’s analysis of individual behavior as-
sumes that people correctly anticipate the effects of consumption
on future preferences and correctly incorporate these predictions
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in their choices [Becker 1996]. The available evidence supports
the more skeptical position. Studies of lay beliefs about the dy-
namics of taste and hedonic experience have shown these beliefs
to be fragmentary and sometimes seriously inaccurate [Snell,
Gibbs, and Varey 1995]. For example, the large effects of sheer
familiarity in increasing liking and enjoyment are not generally
known. Most people are also very surprised to learn that paraple-
gics are not always miserable and that lottery winners are not
particularly happy [Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman 1978],
reecting a pervasive tendency to underestimate the effects of
habituation.
Experimental studies of predicted utility have produced ad-
ditional evidence of poor accuracy. Participants in two experi-
ments were not able to predict how their own taste for ice cream,
low-fat yogurt, or music would change over a week of repeated
consumption [Kahneman and Snell 1992]. Failures of individuals
to predict their own future choices were reported by Simonson
[1990] and by Loewenstein and Adler [1995]. These ndings are
not compatible with the assumption that it is easy to anticipate
future tastes and to plan consumption accordingly.
The errors of remembered utility and the consequent errors
of decision that we reviewed earlier do not exhaust the difculties
that people have in evaluating extended outcomes, nor do they
exhaust the ways in which decisions fail to maximize utility.
Thus, many errors of predicted utility are caused by the practice
of evaluating an entire extended outcome by evaluating the tran-
sition to it. For example, the mistake that most people make in
predicting the well-being of paraplegics may reect their use of
the tragic event of becoming a paraplegic as a proxy in evaluating
the long-term state of being a paraplegic. A similar bias is the
source of many anomalies of choice. Decision makers are suscep-
tible to framing effects and are led to inferior choices because of
the pervasive tendency to evaluate outcomes as changes relative
to a reference point [Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 1991]. The
focus on changes sometimes induces an extreme form of myopia,
where decision makers appear to evaluate a transaction by the
anticipated pleasure or pain of getting or giving up a good, rather
than by evaluating the state of having it [Kahneman 1994]. A
detailed study of remembered utility, predicted utility, and deci-
sion utility can be expected to reveal instructive commonalities,
as well as important differences.
4. Consumer Sovereignty. Some of the arguments for con-
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS396
sumer sovereignty are called into question by the observation of
decisions that systematically fall short of maximizing experi-
enced utility. The dilemma can be illustrated by the example that
introduced this paper. The amnesic patient attaches the same de-
cision utility to the two toasters, although the experienced utility
that the toasters deliver is different. The question is whether the
amnesic’s preferences, which clearly do not maximize experi-
enced utility, should nevertheless be respected. This question is
of interest because the difference between the patient of the story
and normal people may be smaller than is commonly assumed.
As illustrated by the experiments described in Section II, normal
subjects also choose to expose themselves to avoidable pain be-
cause of the peculiarities of remembered utility. Do preferences
that exhibit almost total duration neglect deserve respect?
The point of these observations is not to support paternalism,
but to reject one of the arguments commonly raised against it.
The claim that agents should be left alone because they generally
know what is good for them is less secure than is generally as-
sumed in economic discourse. A sounder case for resisting inter-
ventions in the decisions of individuals can be made on other
grounds, such as the value of freedom and the high risk that coer-
cive power will be abused. Invoking the assumption of rationality
in this context merely denies the existence of a real dilemma.
V. CONCLUSION
The elimination of experienced utility from economic thought
was justied by important considerations, but it was not costless.
Perhaps the heaviest cost was that the exclusive concern with
decision utility removed some important problems from the reach
of empirical research. In particular, the proposition that people
maximize utility was granted the status of a maintained hypothe-
sis, which is used to constrain the interpretation of other facts
but is not itself subject to test. Admitting experienced utility as a
measure of outcomes turns utility maximization into an empiri-
cal proposition, which will probably be found to provide a good
approximation to truth in many situations and to fail severely in
others. The scientic merit of economic analyses that assume
utility maximization will vary accordingly. Considerations of ex-
perienced utility can help identify situations in which the as-
sumption of consumer rationality should be applied with caution,
subjected to empirical test, or avoided altogether.
BACK TO BENTHAM? 397
APPENDIX: A FORMAL ANALYSIS AND PROOFS
We denote by [B,E [ a time interval that contains all time
points relevant to the analysis to avoid technical details. The in-
terval is assumed bounded. For convenience of notation all time
intervals are assumed left-closed and right-open in this analysis.
C is a set of outcomes (describing consumed commodity bundles,
health states, social states, etc.) An episode is a mapping from a
subinterval [b,e[ to C, for b $ B and e # E. A TEO is a mapping
from a nite disjoint union of subintervals of [B,E [ to C.
The set of levels of instant utilities is denoted by X. X is an
interval that contains 0; it may be bounded or unbounded. To
each TEO we assign a dated utility prole, i.e., a function dened
on the same domain as the TEO, but assigning to each time point
of the domain a level of instant utility instead of an outcome. The
instant utility at a time point depends on the outcome associated
with that time point, but also on outcomes associated with other
time points.
Our analysis has been based on the assumption of no dis-
counting. Hence a dated utility prole dened on some interval
[b,e[ is equivalent to a dated utility prole on an interval [b 1 t,
e1 t[ with corresponding instant utilities, for any t. We only need
to know the time duration e 2 b of the interval, and the instant
utility prole over that interval, and we need not know the value
of b or e. Therefore, we assign to each dated utility prole f *,
dened on a time interval [b,e[, a mapping f with domain [0,e 2 b[,
such that f (t) 5 f *(b 1 t) for all t. f is called the undated utility
prole, or utility prole for short. Loosely speaking, we set the
clock at zero at the beginning of each utility prole; i.e., we use
stopwatch time instead of calendar time. The denition reects
the assumption that an hour of some specic level of instant util-
ity yields the same amount of total utility, independent of when
it happens in history.
A utility prole, or prole for short, is a bounded function
from an interval [0,d[ to X, where 0 , d , M with M the maximal
duration that is conceivable; i.e., M 5 E 2 B.7 The utility prole
is complete if its domain is [0,M[. For two proles f,g dened on
[0,a[ and [0,b[, respectively, with a 1 b # M, the concatenation
f&g is dened on [0,a1 b[ and coincides with f on [0,a[ and with g
on [a,a1 b[ (after appropriate translation of the arguments).
7. We make the usual measurability assumptions; i.e., utility proles are
“Lesbesgue-measurable” [Halmos 1950].
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Next we dene utility proles for TEOs. A TEO can be consid-
ered a concatenation of episodes, and we can consider the utility
proles belonging to the separate episodes of a TEO. The utility
prole belonging to a TEO is dened as the concatenation of the
utility proles of the episodes that the TEO consists of. Its dura-
tion is therefore the total duration of the TEO, i.e., the sum of
the durations of the separate episodes. By using the concatena-
tion of the separate utility proles, we drop the information re-
garding the time spans between the separate episodes. That is,
again, a reection of our assumption of zero discounting. The as-
sumption would be eminently unreasonable if utility proles
would assign outcomes to time points instead of instant util-
ities, and illustrates the essential role of instant utility in our
analysis.
To each episode and TEO, a utility prole is assigned through
the above process, and the total utility of an episode or TEO is
simply the total utility of the belonging utility prole. The rest of
the analysis will only concern utility proles.
f is the weak ordering of proles represented by total utility;
i.e., f f g if and only if the total utility of f is at least as high as
that of g. We assume at rst that total utility is measured at an
ordinal level, meaning that f comprises all relevant information.
Therefore, the rst part of our analysis is in terms of f . The re-
striction of f to complete proles is denoted by f c.
We next turn to Axiom 3, monotonicity of f with respect to
total utility. We rst give a formal statement of the axiom.
AXIOM A.1 [monotonicity in total utility, formal statement of
Axiom 3]. If f f g, then f&h f g&h and h&f f h&g whenever
these concatenations are dened. Strict preference in the
premise implies strict preference in the conclusion.
We next demonstrate how versions of separability of f follow
from monotonicity with respect to total utility. We say that f c
satises separability if
(A.2) f g f gc c  implies    f f9 9
whenever, for a partition {I,R} of [0,M[, f 5 g and f 9 5 g9 on
I and f 5 f 9 , g 5 g9 on R. f c satises left separability if (A.2)
holds only for the special case in which I 5 [0,e[ for some e,
and f c satises right separability if (A.2) holds only for the
special case in which I 5 [b,M[ for some b.
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LEMMA A.1. Under Axiom 1 (neutral concatenation), monoton-
icity in total utility implies left- and right-separability for f c.
Proof. For left-separability, let f,f 9 , g,g9 be as above, and as-
sume that I 5 [0,e[. We can write f 5 c&x, g 5 c&y, f 9 5 c9 &x,
g9 5 c 9 &y (dene c as the restriction of f ( 5 g) on [0,e[, x as the
restriction of f ( 5 f 9 ) on [e,M[, “shifted leftwards,” etc.). By mono-
tonicity in total utility, we have
x y c x c y c x c y
x y c x c y c x c y
x y c x c y c x c y
   implies   & and also   
   implies   & and also   
 ~  implies  ~ & and also  ~ 
(apply the
condition both
with   and 
s s s
a a a
f d
& & & .
& & & .
& & &
).
9 9
9 9
9 9
That is, in each case the preference between f and g agrees with
that between f 9 and g 9 . This is what left-separability requires.
Right-separability is derived similarly, considering f 9 5 x&c,
g 5 y&c, f 5 x&c, g9 5 y&c9 .
Our technical condition concerns continuity with respect to
the supremum norm. A sequence of proles f j converges to a pro-
le f (in supremum norm) if these proles are all of the same
duration, and for each positive e there exists a natural number N
such that [ f j (t) 2 f(t)| # e for all j $ N and t in the domain.
Supnorm-continuity means that, for every sequence f j converging
to f in supremum norm, and every g s f, there exists a natural
number N such that g s f j for all j $ N, and the same holds with
a instead of s everywhere. We now state the main theorem
formally.
THEOREM A.1 [formal version of Theorem 1]. Let M . 0. For a
binary relation f dened over the (utility) proles, i.e., all
measurable bounded mappings from subintervals [0,e[ of
[0,M[ to an interval X containing 0, the following two state-
ments are equivalent.
(i) There exists a nondecreasing continuous (“value”) func-
tion v: X ® IR, assigning value 0 to 0, such that proles are
ordered according to the integral of the value of instant util-
ity over time.
(ii) f is a supnorm-continuous weak order, Axiom 1 (neutral
concatenation), Axiom 2 (monotonicity in instant utility), and
Axiom 3 (monotonocity in total utility, i.e., Axiom A.1) hold.
Furthermore, v in (i) is a ratio scale.
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Proof. Since the implication (i) Þ (ii) is easily established,
we assume (ii) and derive (i), as well as the uniqueness result. As
the theorem is trivial if all levels of instant utility are equivalent
(then all proles are equivalent by Axiom 2, and v 5 0), we as-
sume that there are two levels of instant utility that are not
equivalent. Because of neutral concatenation, we will mostly re-
strict attention to the weak ordering f c of the complete proles
dened on all of [0,M[. By Lemma A.1, monotonicity in total util-
ity implies left- and right-separability of f c.
For some n f 3, we now partition the interval [0,M[ into n
subintervals [m0,m1[, . . . , [mn 2 1,mn[ of equal length M/n (m0 5 0,
mn 5 M). By (x1, . . . , xn) we denote the complete prole that as-
signs xj to all time points in the jth interval. This set of complete
proles, denoted by F n, is isomorphic to Xn, and we now study the
restriction f r of f c to F n. We rst show that any interval [mj 2 1,mj[
is essential with respect to f r , i.e., proles from F n that agree
outside of the interval need not be equivalent.
Assume that the level of instant utility x is strictly preferred
to y; i.e., the complete prole that is constant x is strictly pre-
ferred to the complete prole that is constant y. Assume, for con-
tradiction, that x[mj 2 1,mj[ ~ y[mj 2 1,mj[, where we follow the
convention of using the set [mj 2 1,mj[ to denote also the indicator
function that is 1 on [mj 2 1,mj[ and 0 on the rest of [0,M[. By Ax-
iom 1, x[mi 2 1,mi[ ~ y[mi 2 1,mi[ also holds for all i different than j.
Then, by left- and right-separability, y[0,M[ ~ x[0,m1[ 1 y[m1,
M[ ~ x[0,m2[ 1 y[m2, M[ ~ . . . ~ x[0,mn 2 1[ 1 y[mn 2 1, M[ ~ x[0, M[,
contradicting our assumption that y[0,M[ a x[0,M[. So every in-
terval [mj 2 1,mj[ is essential with respect to f r.
Because all intervals are essential and n $ 3, and f r is a
continuous weak order that satises left- and right-separability,
it satises full-force separability by Gorman [1968], and there ex-
ist functions V1, . . . , Vn such that V1(x1) 1 . . . 1 Vn(xn) represents
f r of F n. We may, and will, assume that Vj(0) 5 0 for all j. Because
Axiom 1, (x,0, . . . , 0) ~ (0,x,0, . . . , 0) ~ . . . ~ (0, . . . , 0,x), and this
implies that V1(x) 5 . . . 5 Vn(x) for all x. We dene v(x) 5 V1(x)/
(m1 2 m0). We can then conclude that the integral of v represents
preferences over F n. By Axiom 2, v is nondecreasing. As the above
analysis holds true for all n and thus for a dense subset of the
complete proles, supnorm-continuity implies that f c is repre-
sented by the integral of v on the whole set of complete proles.
By zero-concatenation it now follows that the representation ex-
tends to all proles.
Gorman [1968] also demonstrated that the Vj functions de-
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rived above are unique up to location and a common scale. This,
their unique relatedness to v, and v(0) 5 0, imply that v is a ra-
tio scale.
Proof of Theorem 2. We assume the same technical condi-
tions (M, domain, and supnorm-continuity) as in Theorem A.1.
The necessity of Axiom 4 for linearity of the value function is obvi-
ous—hence we assume the axiom and derive the representation.
Note that we do not have Axiom 3 (A.1) available. Therefore, we
must derive it in some way. A step prole is a nite concatenation
of constant proles; i.e., it is nite-valued, and it is constant
over intervals.
LEMMA A.2. Axiom 4 implies Axiom 3 (A.1) for step proles.
Proof. Assume that, for step proles x,y,c, we have x f y, and
that c&x and c&y are dened. First, assume that c is constant. c9
denotes the neutral prole of the same duration as c. By neutral
concatenation, we get c9 &x ~ x f y ~ c9 &y. By Axiom 4 we can add
up the instant utility of c over the duration of c and get c&x f e
c&y. We can repeat this for other constant proles c1, . . . , cn, to
get cn& . . . & c1 & c & x f cn& . . . & c1 & c & y. Every step-prole
c0 can be written as a concatenation cn & . . . & c1 & c, and hence
we get c0 &x f c 0 &y for all step proles c0 . Similarly, x&c 0 f y&c 0
follows. The same reasoning also applies to strict instead of
weak preferences.
In the proof of Theorem 1/A.1, we only needed Axiom 3 (A.1)
and its implications (e.g. left- and right-separability), and in fact
all conditions except weak ordering and supnorm-continuity, for
step proles. Hence we can invoke the representation of the theo-
rem. Partition [0,M[ into [0,M/2[ and [M/2,M[. The notation
(x1, x2) designates here the prole that is x1 on the rst interval
and x2 on the second. Now (x,0) ~ (x,0)—hence, by Axiom 4, (x,e )
~ (x 1 e ,0). This implies that v(x 1 e ) 2 v(x) 5 v( e ) for all x and e ;
i.e., v satises the Cauchy equation. For the nondecreasing v that
implies that v is linear.
QED
All the results above have assumed total utility only at the
ordinal level, and have characterized total utility as an increas-
ing transform of an integral (because it induces the same order-
ing over proles as the integral). We next consider the case in
which total utility is measurable at the cardinal level. That can
be tested by the following axiom.
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AXIOM A.2 [cardinal total utility]. The total utility of two concate-
nated proles is the sum of their separate total utilities.
In the presence of Axiom A.2, Theorems 1 and 2 can be
strengthened to provide total utility as an integral of the value of
instant utility and the integral of instant utility, respectively. We
assume in the theorems below the same technical conditions (M,
domain, weak ordering, supnorm-continuity) as in Theorem A.1.
THEOREM A.2. Axioms 1, 2, and A.2 hold if and only if total utility
is an integral of the value of instant utility.
Proof. Necessity of the axioms is obvious—hence we assume
the axiom and derive the representation. Axiom A.2 implies
Axiom 3, and hence we obtain the integral representation of
Theorem A.1. Note that the integral of the value function does
satisfy Axiom A.2.
Let (x1, x2) be the complete prole that is x1 on [0,M/2[ and x2
on [M/2,M[. Both total utility and the integral of the value func-
tion provide additively decomposable representations for f , that
both assign 0 to the neutral prole. By standard uniqueness re-
sults on additive conjoint measurement (continuity of total utility
need not be presupposed here but is implied, see Wakker, [1988]),
total utility must be a positive scalar times the integral. We can
divide the value function by that positive scalar.
COROLLARY A.1. Under the technical conditions of Theorem A.3,
Axioms 1, 2, 4, and A.2 hold if and only if total utility is the
integral of instant utility.
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